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TITLE VII: COMPLAINT AND ENFORCEMENT
PROCEDURES AND RELIEF AND REMEDIES
R. WAYNE WALKER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The most significant feature of the Title VIP enforcement scheme
is that it lodges the formal power of adjudication exclusively in the
courts,' rather, than giving quasi-judicial power to an administrative
agency. This is true even though the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (hereinafter Commission) is firmly connected with one of
the two sets of procedures established by the statute for enforcement
of its prohibitions against employment discrimination. The procedure
involving the Commission is described in section 706, supplemented by
the Commission's rules and regulations. 3 It begins when a charge is
filed with the Commission, either by a person claiming to be aggrieved
or by a member of the Commission. The Commission then attempts
to eliminate the discriminatory practice by conciliation and persuasion.
If this attempt fails the Commission's formal role ends. The next step
is a court action, brought not by the Commission but by the aggrieved
person. The second system of enforcement also involves a court
action, in this case a "pattern or practice" suit instituted by the
Attorney General under section 707. In addition, the Attorney General
may seek to intervene in an enforcement action commenced by an
aggrieved person under section 706 if the Attorney General "certifies
that the case is of general public importance."'
* A.B., University of California, Berkeley, 1956; LL.B., University of California,
Berkeley, 1960; Member, California Bar ; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Mary-
land Law School. The author wishes to thank Professor Sanford Jay Rosen of the
University of Maryland Law School for his generous assistance in the preparation of
this article.
78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964) [hereinafter cited by section only].
2 Under section 706(f), federal district courts are given jurisdiction over Title VII
actions. This eliminates the amount in controversy requirement which would be appli-
cable under the general federal question jurisdiction statute 62 Stat. 930 (1948), as
amended, 28 U.S.C. 1331 (1964). Nothing is said as to whether federal courts may
exercise pendent jurisdiction over related state actions (e.g., an action under a state
FEP law), although the statute does say that Congress has not occupied the field.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 1104, 78 Stat. 268, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1964). No guidance is
given as to whether state courts may exercise jurisdiction over Title VII actions, but it
might follow that they can, by analogy to cases holding that state courts may exercise
jurisdiction over certain suits for violation of collective bargaining agreements under
Section 301(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,
368 U.S. 502 (1962) ; but that they must apply federal substantive law in doing so, Team-
sters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
8
 The Commission has issued Procedural Regulations, to be included as Chapter XIV
to 29 C.F.R. 30 Fed. Reg. 8407 (1965).
4 § 706(e). .
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Although neither system involves quasi-judicial adjudication,
the non-judicial branch of government is significantly involved in each.
Consequently, it seems somewhat inaccurate to epitomize the Title
VII enforcement philosophy as one which involves the enforcement
of "individual rights," in contrast to other federal regulatory systems
which are said to enforce "public rights." The "private right" approach
has been discussed by some writers' and by at least one court." The
present writer's position will be mentioned again in the conclusion,
but first there will be a discussion of some of the problems of enforce-
ment procedure and remedies under the statute.
II. PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURE
The statute's enforcement procedures present so many opportuni-
ties for comment that it is difficult to choose either the subjects for
comment or the depth with which to treat them. A number of problems
will be mentioned and a few commented upon at greater length, but
the depth of treatment will not be exhaustive nor the breadth en-
cyclopedic. There is no concentrated coverage of Attorney General's
pattern or practice suits, although reference to them does appear from
time to time.
Many of the detailed problems of statutory interpretation involve
section 706, which specifies in great detail the Commission-to-court
enforcement process which culminates in an individual claimant's court
action. One very interesting problem is whether an individual's court
action to enforce his substantive right to be free from employment dis-
crimination, granted by section 703, must follow the procedures set
out in section 706. The answer affects this basic question: What is the
nature of the system created by Congress to enforce Title VII? What
are the respective roles of individuals, the Attorney General, the Com-
mission, and the courts?
A. Proceedings Before Commission as Prerequisite to Court Action
A threshhold problem of enforcement procedure is whether it is
mandatory that a complaint alleging employment discrimination be
lodged with the Commission before an individual may commence court
proceedings to enforce his rights under the statute.? The answer is
u See e.g., Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 31 Brooklyn L. Rev. 62 (1964); Comment, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 430 (1965). Each
of these was published prior to the Supreme Court's decision in International Union,
UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965), discussed infra note 108.
0 Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 61 L.R.R.M. 2458 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
7 Apparently no complaint need be filed with the Commission as a prerequisite to
an Attorney General's pattern or practice suit. No mention of such a requirement is
made by 707 and, according to then Senator Humphrey's remarks during Senate
debates, no such requirement is imposed. 110 Cong. Rec. 12724 (1964). For discussion of
the significance to be accorded Senator Humphrey's statements, see note 9 infra and
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unclear. In part, the uncertainty is created by the language of section
706(e), which reads as follows:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Com-
mission or within thirty days after the expiration of any
period of reference . . . the Commission has been unable to
obtain voluntary compliance with this title, the Commission
shall so notify the person aggrieved and a civil action may,
within thirty days thereafter, be brought against the re-
spondent named in the charge. .
The statute does not explicitly say that an individual may not sue
unless a complaint has first been lodged with the Commission. Its
language is permissive rather than prohibitive: an action may be
brought after a charge has been filed with the Commission and volun-
tary compliance has not been secured. A literal interpretation of the
language would not require a complaint to be filed with the Com-
mission first. However, the overall structure of section 706, with its
provisions . for bringing complaints before the Commission, its narrow
time limits, its provisions for state deference, and its rather detailed
specification of an unusual enforcement process, may perhaps be taken
to indicate that all the procedures required therein are to be followed
in connection with any enforcement action brought by an individual.
This of course would include a requirement that a charge be filed with
the Commission before the individual commences court action.
Considerable doubt is cast upon the foregoing conclusion by the
following remarks of then Senator Humphrey, floor manager for
the bill in the Senate, during Senate debates: "The individual may
proceed [to the courts] in his own right at any time. He may take his
complaint to the Commission, he may bypass the Commission, or he
may go directly to court.' Other interpretive remarks of Senator
Humphrey have been relied on by the Supreme Court to ascertain the
meaning of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' so his interpreta-
tions of the bill while guiding its passage in the Senate are of special
import."
accompanying text. For a discussion of this problem in the context of a class action, see
note 10 infra.
8
 110 Cong. Rec. 14188 (1964).
0 See Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 311 (1964).
10 A recent case provides an interesting solution by holding that a Title VII action
may be brought on behalf of a class of plaintiffs who had not been named as individuals
in complaints before the Commission, but only insofar as a general injunction was sought
to prohibit the employer from maintaining discriminatory employment practices. Hall v.
Werthan Bag Corp., supra note 6. The court noted that the Commission had already
attempted to deal with the general practices of segregation allegedly followed by the
respondent as a consequence of a complaint filed by an individual who was also a
named party in the class action, "[T]herefore," says the court, "the purpose of the
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To justify an individual's bypass of the Commission it may be
argued that he can sue directly under section 703, which prohibits
employment discrimination, and that the enforcement scheme estab-
lished by section 706, involving conciliatory activities by the Com-
mission, applies only when the complaining individual elects to use the
good offices of the Commission to assist him in handling his claim.
Until the courts have resolved the problem, prospective litigants should
make sure that a timely charge is filed with the Commission before
court proceedings are instituted.
B. Timeliness in Filing Charges with Commission
Determining whether a charge is timely may in some circum-
stances have to await judicial clarification of section 706(d), which
provides that a charge made to the Commission
shall be filed within ninety days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred, except that in the case of an
unlawful employment practice with respect to which the
person aggrieved has followed the procedure set out in sub-
section (b), such charge shall be filed by the person aggrieved
within two hundred and ten days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after
receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated
the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is
earlier. . . .
(Subsection (b) of section 706, referred to in the foregoing quotation,
requires an aggrieved person to commence proceedings before certain
types of state or local FEP agencies prior to filing a charge with the
Federal Commission.) It would appear from the quoted language that
the normal ninety-day period may sometimes be reduced, rather than
extended, when state or local enforcement proceedings have been com-
menced by the aggrieved individual. Apparently this would happen
when the individual receives notice of the termination of state or local
proceedings less than sixty days after the unlawful employment
practice occurred. This follows from the requirement that charges be
filed with the Federal Commission within thirty days after the indi-
vidual receives notice of termination of the state or local proceedings.
If a complainant finds himself in a situation where the basic ninety-
requirement of resort to the Commission has already been served." Id. at 2460. But
insofar as the class action sought back pay or reinstatement for members of the class of
plaintiffs on whose behalf complaints had not been filed with the Commission, "the pur-
pose of the other administrative remedies requirement" has not been satisfied, "for the
Commission has not attempted conciliation in regard to rectifying any alleged injuries
which" such claimants claim to have suffered. Ibid. There is no indication in the opinion
that Senator Humphrey's remarks were called to the court's attention.
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day period has not expired but where he seems to be barred from filing
charges because the thirty-day period has run, he should make every
effort to see that a member of the Commission files a charge, since the
statute seems to indicate that a Commissioner's charge may (indeed
must) be filed within the ninety-day period, without regard to the
commencement of state or local enforcement proceedings. 11
Another problem of timeliness under section 706(d) can arise
when the individual has commenced state or local enforcement pro-
ceedings under section 706(b), but it turns out that the state or local
enforcement system was not of the type described in section 706(b).
Does this mean that his basic ninety-day period for filing a charge with
the Commission may not be extended? While respondents can be ex-
pected to argue that the ninety-day period is not extended in such
circumstances, such a conclusion probably is not warranted by the
language of the statute, which provides for modification of the ninety-
day period "in case of an unlawful employment practice with respect
to which the person aggrieved has followed the procedure set out in
subsection (b). . . ." The procedure set out in subsection (b) is simply
the commencement of state or local proceedings. The description
therein of kinds of state or local FEP laws is not part of the procedure
followed by the person aggrieved, but rather an indication of when
the procedure must be followed. If section 706(d) had been intended to
impose upon the individual the risk of misinterpreting the nature of the
state or local FEP laws, it would seem that the language just quoted
would have read "in the case of an unlawful employment practice with
respect to which the person aggrieved is required to follow the pro-
cedure set out in subsection (b). . . ." The suggestion that there may
be difficulty in determining which state or local FEP laws come within
the definitions of section 706(b) has not been manufactured. The Com-
mission appears to have encountered difficulty in this regard, and has
made some decisions of arguable validity."
C. Timeliness in Commencing Court Actions
Litigants also face problems of timeliness in commencement of
court actions. The most significant practical problem is probably the
shortness of the period—thirty days: hardly enough time for a
claimant to locate and retain an attorney and for the attorney to com-
11 Section 706(d) states that when the person aggrieved has commenced state or
local enforcement proceedings, a charge shall be filed with the Commission "by the
person aggrieved within two hundred and ten days. . . ." (Emphasis added.) No refer-
ence is made in this connection to the filing of a charge by a Commissioner.
12 The Commission has apparently decided, at least informally, that the criminal
remedies provided by certain state FEP laws are not of the type contemplated by
§§ 706(b), (c) of Title VII, even though those sections refer only to "criminal proceed-
ings" without specifying a particular type of criminal proceeding.
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mence an action, especially an unfamiliar action under a new statute.
Besides the shortness of the period there are problems of statutory in-
terpretation concerning when the thirty-day period begins. The perti-
nent statutory language is set out in the accompanying footnote." One
problem is whether the thirty-day period begins when the Commission
gives notice or when notice is received. This perennial problem in
notice statutes is so obvious and common that the draftsmen are sub-
ject to severe criticism for failing to solve it. No suggestions will be
made here for its solution, other than to note that claimants should be
sure to file their actions at a time which avoids the problem.
A second problem is whether the thirty days begins to run at the
end of the period given to the Commission to act or at the time of
notice from the Commission. (For simplicity, the discussion of this
problem assumes that the first problem noted above is resolved by
saying that the pertinent date is when the Commission gives notice.)
The problem can be focused on more sharply by considering the follow-
ing excerpt from the statutory language which, for illustrative pur-
poses, mentions only one of the various periods given to the Com-
mission to act:
If within thirty days 'after a charge is filed with the
Commission . , the Commission has been unable to obtain
voluntary compliance with this title, the Commission shall so
notify the person aggrieved and a civil action may, within
thirty days thereafter, be brought. . . . 14
The solution is easy if notice is given exactly thirty days after the
charge is filed. The thirty-day period for filing suit starts then. But
what if the date of the Commission's notice is either less than or more
than thirty days after the charge is filed with the CommisSion? Does
"thereafter" refer to the date of the Commission's notice or to the
expiration of the thirty-day period which began when the charge was
filed with the Commission? From the grammatical structure it would
seem to refer to the date of the Commission's notice. However, if the
Commission's notice is late, respondents can be expected to argue that
they have a right to have enforcement suits commenced within thirty
days after the period provided for action by the Commission (thirty
days in the example under consideration). Similarly, when the Corn-
13 "If within thirty days after a charge is fried with the Commission or within
thirty days after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) (except that
in either case such period may be extended to not more than sixty days upon a deter-
mination by the Commission that further efforts to secure voluntary compliance are
warranted), the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with this
title, the Commission shall so notify the person aggrieved and a civil action may, within
thirty days thereafter, be brought against the respondent. . . ." § 706(e).
14 Ibid.
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mission gives early notice, claimants can be expected to argue (when
necessary) that they have the right to withhold commencement of their
actions until thirty days after the period provided for action by the
Commission. Until the courts resolve the problem claimants would
be well advised to commence their actions at a time which satisfies
all of the alternative interpretations whenever possible.
D. Economic Burdens on Private Litigants; Attorney's Fees
One of the difficulties of committing an important part of the
process of implementing social reform legislation to private individuals
is their inability to finance the implementation activities. Maintenance
of court actions is the step in the enforcement process which Title VII
has committed to individuals. The Commission's conciliation services
and other implementation activities are of course financed by the
Government. But court action itself can be maintained at government
expense only when it is brought by the Attorney General as a pattern
or practice suit, and a portion of the expense may be borne by the
Government if the Attorney . General elects to intervene in the indi-
vidual's action. Unfortunately, even though the provision for pattern
or practice suits has been in effect for one year longer than the other
enforcement provisions of Title VII, the first suit of this kind does
not appear to have been commenced until the early part of 1966.' 5
Besides relieving private individuals of the costs of litigation, such
actions may contribute to the implementation process by enforcing
the statute in situations where individuals are unwilling to sue, as,
for example, when they fear personal reprisal. Pattern or practice ac-
tions can also be used to prevent activities which may not be subject
to suit by individuals, such as organized campaigns to encourage or
coerce noncompliance with the statute.
The statute eases the economic burdens on private persons who
conduct enforcement litigation by allowing a court to do the follow-
ing: (1) Appoint an attorney for the complainant;" (2) authorize
commencement of the action "without payment of fees, costs, or
security"; 17 and (3) award an attorney's fee to the complainant if he
prevails."'
The attorney's fee provision may well provide a key to the devel-
opment of widespread grass roots enforcement activity. If attorneys
can expect a reasonable fee they obviously will gain motivation to take
15 For announcement of the first suit, see 61 Lab. Rel. Rep. 102 (1966). Section 707,
which authorizes pattern or practice suits, took immediate effect upon enactment of the
Civil Rights Act on July 2, 1964 (§ 716(b)), whereas most of Title VII did not become
effective until one year later (§ 716(a)).
10	 706(e).
IT Ibid.
10 § 706(k).
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a Title VII case. Attorneys furnished by civil rights organizations
(who probably will conduct the bulk of Title VII litigation, especially
in the South)' should be able to anticipate that they will be com-
pensated as liberally as other attorneys.
Recent experience with awards of attorney's fees in federal courts
tends to indicate that at least some courts will be liberal both in their
willingness to make awards and in the amounts of their awards. In cases
under the Landrum-Griffin Act" some awards have been quite liberal.'
It is not suggested that the substantive basis for attorney's fee awards
under Title VII is the same as under the Landrum-Griffin Act: the
statutory provisions are different in phrasing and theory," and insofar
as the Landrum-Griffin cases go beyond the express authorization of
the statute they do so on a theory which is not applicable to all Title
VII actions." Perhaps the liberality of some of the courts will extend
to Title VII.
The Landrum-Griffin experience is especially pertinent to Title
VII in that both statutes deal with employment relations, but cases
which award attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs in school desegre-
gation litigation are also pertinent because they parallel the civil rights
aspect of Title VII. Perhaps the leading case requiring an award of
attorney's fees in a school desegregation case is Judge Sobeloff's deci-
sion in Bell v. School Bd. 24 Unfortunately, plaintiffs seeking attorney's
fees have encountered tough sledding in subsequent cases,' and Judge
Sobeloff himself was forced to dissent in Bradley v. School Bd. on the
ground that an award of a seventy-five dollar attorney's fee was
"egregiously inadequate." 28 In the light of Bradley it is perhaps unwise
12 Most claims presented to the Commission so far have been the result of efforts
of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., whose enforcement campaign
has been directed to states in the South.
20 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 401 (1964).
21 E.g., in one case attorney's fees of $38,000 were awarded even though the highest
verdict which could have been awarded in the case was $24,921.41. Highway Truck
Drivers v. Cohen, 54 L.R.R.M. 2194 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
22 The Landrum-Griffin Act § 501(b), 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 501(b)
(1964), states that in certain actions by a union member to recover a fund belonging
to the union, "the trial judge may allot a reasonable part of the recovery ... to pay the
fees of counsel prosecuting the suit at the instance of the member. . . ." (Some courts
have gone beyond this authorization. See cases cited note 23 infra.) Section 706(k) of
Title VII provides that the court "in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs. . ." Section 431(c) of the Landrum-Griffin Act authorizes an award of attorney's
fees to a union member-plaintiff in an action to compel disclosure of certain information.
23 Compare, e.g., Bakery Workers v. Ratner, 335 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1964), with
McCraw v. United Ass'n of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing Industry,
341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965).
24 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963), 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1135 (1964).
25 See, e.g., Rogers v. Paul, 345 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1965); Brown v. County School
Bd., 234 F. Stipp. 808 (WD. Va. 1964).
26 345 F.2d 310, 324 (4th Cir. 1965) (dissenting opinion).
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to place much emphasis on cases which indicate that attorney's fees
should be awarded under the Bell doctrine.' The tendency of the later
cases is to limit awards to situations described (perhaps unfortunately)
in Bell in connection with its holding that the trial court erred in failing
to award attorney's fees. The opinion noted the defendants'
long continued pattern of evasion and obstruction which in-
cluded not only the defendants' unyielding refusal to take any
initiative . . . , but their interposing a variety of administra-
tive obstacles to thwart the valid wishes of the plaintiffs for a
desegregated education.'
A number of federal statutes provide for the award of attorney's
fees in civil cases." Heavy reliance on the form of expression used in
the statutes has caused one annotator to formulate principles of statu-
tory interpretation which would lead to undesirable results if applied to
Title VII." The annotation in question divides the federal attorney's
fee statutes into two classes. It concludes that one class of statutes,
those which say that attorney's fees "shall" be awarded to the plaintiff
if he prevails, seek "to encourage the bringing of suits or to discourage
defenses against such actions."" The second class of statutes, those
which say the court "may" award an attorney's fee to the prevailing
party, whether plaintiff or defendant, "seem to manifest a congressional
intent to discourage the bringing of unmeritorious suits or the raising
of unmeritorious defenses.''' No authority is cited for this latter
proposition.
27 E.g., Buckner v. County School Bd., 332 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1964) (Sobeloff,
C.J.); Pettaway v. County School Bd. 230 F. Supp. 480, 487 (ED. Va. 1964).
28 Bell v. School Bd., supra note 24, at 500. Note that the quoted language can be
used very easily to justify awards of attorney's fees in Title VII cases, where patterns of
evasion, obstruction and refusal will frequently exist.
20 Such statutes were collected and discussed in Annot,, 8 L. Ed. 2d 894, 915 (1963).
Pertinent statutes not mentioned include Landrum-Griffin Act § 501(b), 73 Stat.
536 (19.59), 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1964).
ao Annot., supra note 29. The annotation was published before Title VII was en-
acted, and the discussion here is directed to the principles it states, not to its analysis
of Title VII.
31
 Ibid., citing Hutchinson v. William C. Barry, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 292 (D. Mass.
1943). The annotation lists the following statutory sections as falling into this class: 42
Stat. 165 (1921), 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1964) (Packers and Stockyards Act); 46 Stat. 534
(1930), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (1964) (Perishable Agricultural Commodities
Act); 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) (anti-trust cases); 52 Stat. 1062
(1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1964) (Fair Labor Standards Act); 44 Stat. 578
(1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1964) (Railway Labor Act); 49 Stat. 2014
(1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1228 (1964) (Merchant Marine Act); 48 Stat. 1072,
47 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (1964) (Communications Act of 1934) ; 24 Stat. 382 (1887), 54 Stat.
940 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 8, 16(c), 908(b), (d) (1964) (Interstate Commerce
Act). /
32 Annot., supra note 29. The annotation Lists the following statutory sections as
falling into this class: 48 Stat. 82 (1933), 15 U.S.C.
	 77k(e) (1964) (Securities Act of
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Even though the Title VII provision is of the "may be awarded to
the prevailing party" variety, it should be interpreted to encourage
suits by complainants, not to discourage them. Attorney's fees should
be awarded to successful complainants routinely, almost as a matter of
course. Such awards should not be frustrated by the fact that certain
other statutes say attorney's fees "shall" be awarded to a successful
plaintiff. Of the eight statutory systems cited by the annotation as
falling into the "shall" class, four involve suits against respondents who
have not complied with prior administrative orders directed against
them." Two have provisions for a penal award of attorney's fees in
connection with an award of treble" or double" damages. Both situa-
tions justify a mandatory award of attorney's fees to the successful
complainant in all cases. In one, the respondent has already been
ordered to do something by administrative decision. In the other, he
is guilty of such heinous misconduct as to justify, double or treble
damages. Neither is applicable to Title VII actions. The purpose of an
award of attorney's fees under Title VII is to make it feasible for the
complainant to enforce his rights, not to penalize the respondent. 3 °
While a preliminary review of the statutes which say attorney's
fees "may" be awarded does not permit a blanket statement that they
have always been applied to favor claimants, it has, for example, been
stated that under the Copyright Act "counsel fees are more frequently
awarded in favor of successful plaintiffs."37 In addition to a discre-
tionary award of attorney's fees, the Copyright Act provides for a
mandatory award of "full costs."" It would therefore appear that the
1933) ; 53 Stat. 1176 (1933), 15 US.C. § 77www(a) (1964) (Trusts Indenture Act); 48
Stat. 889, 897 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(e), r(a) (1964) (Securities Exchange Act);
61 Stat. 665 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1964) (Copyright Act); 66 Stat. 813 (1952), 35
U.S.C. § 285 (1964) (Patent Act. An earlier, somewhat different, version is found in
29 Stat. 694 (1897), as amended, 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1964)); 72 Stat. 1214 (1958), 38
U.S.C. § 1822(b) (1964) (Servicemen's Readjustment Act). The annotation would
presumably include § 501(b) of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§ 501(b) (1964), in this category. Section 431(c) of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 73 Stat.
524 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 431(c) (1964), would seem to fall somewhere in between the
annotator's two classes.
33 Railway Labor Act, Packers & Stockyards Act, and Perishable Agricultural Com-
modities Act. The fourth, the Interstate Commerce Act, has certain provisions which fall
into this category, 24 Stat. 384 (1897), 54 Stat. 940 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 16(2), 908(e) (1964), and others which do not, 24 Stat. 382 (1887), 54 Stat. 940
(1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 8, 908(b) (1964).
34 Act of June 29, 1940, 54 Stat. 690.
35 Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1964).
36 This point is elaborated upon infra, p. 506.
37 Kaplan & Brown, Cases on Copyright, Unfair Competition, and Other Topics
Bearing on the Protection of Literary, Musical and Artistic Works 408 (1960). The
awards are authorized by 61 Stat. 665 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1964).
38 61 Stat. 665 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1964). The costs provisions apparently are
intended to be applied in favor of the prevailing party. For a discussion of costs pro-
visions, see Nimmers, Copyright § 16, at 701. The statutory provision takes the
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attorney's fee provisions were intended merely to supplement the costs
provisions in appropriate cases, a conclusion which is reinforced by the
fact that the attorney's fee and costs provisions are in the same section
of the statute. Attorney's fees under Title VII should therefore be
awarded more liberally than under the Copyright Act, since under
Title VII they do not merely supplement a mandatory costs relief
provision.
The Patent Act (another "may" statute) if anything confirms the
proposition that Title VII attorney's fees should be liberally awarded,
since the Patent Act expressly limits the award of attorney fees to the
prevailing party to "exceptional cases." 39 The Securities Act limits the
award to cases where "the court believes the suit or defense to have
been without merit. . . ."" The Servicemen's Readjustment Act may
not be distinguished on such grounds, but it is unusual in that under
certain circumstances the veteran's action may be prosecuted by "the
Attorney General, in the name of the Government of the United States
... in which event one-third of any recovery in said action shall be paid
over to the veteran and two-thirds thereof shall be paid into the Trea-
sury of the United States.'
All of the federal attorney's fee statutes have not been discussed,
but a search for the meaning of the Title VII provisions in the language
and application of other statutes is to a great extent bound to be sterile
and unprofitable. A better guide is the underlying policy of Title VII.
Its attorney's fee provisions should be interpreted in a way which will
further Title VII's purpose, which is to prevent employment discrimina-
tion which significantly affects commerce. The statute creates an en-
forcement scheme which requires individual complainants to conduct
their own enforcement litigation, in contrast to other federal statutes
providing remedies to employees and would-be employees." If the
award of costs "out of the operation of Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure which permits judicial discretion in the awarding of costs." Howell, Copy-
right Law 178 (rev. ed. 1962).
as 66 Stat. 813 (1952), 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1964).
40 48 Stat. 82 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(g) (1964). But several other statutory provi-
sions in the area of securities regulation may not be so distinguished. Cf. 48 Stat. 889, 897
(1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), r(a) (1964). Another provision, 53 Stat. 1176 (1939), 15
U.S.C. § 77www(a) (1964), says the discretionary award of attorney's fees should be
made with "due regard to the merits and good faith of the suit or defense."
41
 72 Stat. 1214 (1958), 38 U.S.C. § 1822(b) (1964).
42 E.g., under the NLRA, the ;NLRB can bear practically all the cost of enforce-
ment, from investigation through administrative adjudication to court enforcement pro-
ceedings; the veterans' re-employment statutes are administered in part analogously to
Title VII in that the Government (through the Department of Labor) represents the
veteran in an effort to settle his claim, but if adjudication is necessary the U.S. Attorney
can represent the veteran in his court enforcement action; under the wage-hour laws the
Department of Labor not only represents the claimant in settlement negotiations, but the
Secretary of Labor can initiate court enforcement action; under the Landrum-Griffin
Act, 73 Stat. .519 (1959) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), the Secretary of
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system of private enforcement is to be viable there must be a source
of 'funds to pay the complainant's attorney's fee, and an attorney who
is asked to take a Title VII case should be able to anticipate that a fee
will be awarded almost as a matter of course if the complainant is suc-
cessful. The system of individual enforcement was the result of a con-
scious, explicit rejection of a system of administrative enforcement,"
and liberal awards of attorney's fees to successful complainants are
necessary if the system is to work as intended.
.	 The traditional American policy against awards of attorney's
fees" does not require a restrictive application of the Title VII prov-
sions. On the contrary, since the traditional policy is so ingrained and
widely known, the statute can only be regarded as a deliberate depar-
ture from the traditional policy. Hence, as is said of remedial statutes
generally, the attorney's fee provision should be liberally construed
and applied.
The statute's provision for awards of attorney's fees to the pre-
vailing "party" does not mean they should be made to prevailing
respondents as liberally as to prevailing claimants. One of the primary
purposes of Title VII is to benefit minority groups (for the overall
betterment of all persons to be sure), and Congress was fully apprised
of the economically depressed condition of most minority groups when
Title VII was under consideration.° Persons of low income obviously
cannot afford to pay attorneys, and it would seem that the attorney's
fee provisions are a reflection of Congress's concern with the low in-
come of minority groups. The statutory provisions authorizing waiver
of claimants' costs and fees" corroborates the assertion that Congress
was concerned with easing the economic burdens which otherwise
would be borne by the litigating claimant. Statements in the legislative
history directly support the argument that it is the claimant who is to
be benefited by the attorney's fee provisions. 47 Awards to respondents
should be limited to unusual situations, such as defense against clearly
fraudulent claims.
Labor conducts court actions to enforce some of the statute's provisions, the individual
does so with other provisions, and both the Secretary and the individual can enforce
still other provisions.
43
 This is shown by the fact that provisions for administrative adjudication were
included in and then dropped from the bill during its legislative history. See e.g., Vaas,
Title VII: Legislative History, supra p. 431.
44 See, e.g., Ritter v. Ritter, 381 Ill. 549, 46 N.Er.,2d 41 (1943).
43 See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 8998 & 8999 Before the General Subcommittee on
Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 133,
139 (1965).
46 	706(e).
47 Senator Humphrey stated during Senate debates that the attorney's fee provision
is designed "to make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious
suit." 110 Cong. Rec. 12724 (1964). For comments on the significance to be attached to
Senator Humphrey's statements, see note 9 supra and accompanying text.
506
TITLE VII: COMPLAINT PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES
E. Jury Trial
The statute says nothing about jury trial in ordinary enforcement
litigation, although it does cover the subject in connection with con-
tempt proceedings. 48
 The absence of express statutory guidance throws
the problem into the maze of decisions dealing with the right to jury
trial in federal courts. The issues are too complex to explore completely
in this article, but a few preliminary thoughts will be presented in the
hope that they may assist in unraveling this difficult problem. The
Constitution's reference in article III, section 2, to the existence of
judicial power "in Law and Equity" has produced comments on the
extent of Congress's power to extend or contract the right to jury trial
in areas within the traditional cognizance of law and equity," but most
discussion of the constitutional aspects of the question centers around
the seventh amendment, which guarantees the right to jury trial in
most common-law actions.
One approach to the problem involves comparison of the newly
created statutory right with traditional common-law rights. The right
to jury trial is said to be preserved when the new statutory right is
found to be essentially "legal" in nature. The solution is thus sought by
an inquiry into the "nature of the right." Applying this approach to
Title VII, one might conclude that there is no right to jury trial, since
the claimant's right to be free f min employment discrimination was not
a right found at common law, nor is it analogous to a common-law
right. As will be pointed out below, in the writer's opinion this is
probably neither the correct approach to use nor the correct answer,
although litigants who want a jury trial and who face a judicial inten-
tion to use this approach should look further into the common-law
actions to see if they can find a parallel.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp." should not be inter-
preted to hold that no constitutional right to jury trial exists under
Title VII. The case held that the seventh amendment did not require a
jury trial in an unfair labor practice proceeding under the National
Labor Relations Act. In rejecting the argument that a decision of the
NLRB ordering reinstatement of and payment of back wages to em-
ployees who had been discriminatorily•discharged was invalid because
it amounted to a money judgment and hence was triable to a jury as a
common law action, the Court said that the case
48 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 1101, 78 Stat. 268, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h (1964),
expressly grants a right to jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings and preserves the
right of the court to conduct civil contempt proceedings without a jury "to secure
compliance with or to prevent obitruction of, as distinguished from punishment for
violations of, any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the court. . .."
49 See, e.g., 5 Moore, Federal Practice 1111 38.08[1], .11143 (2d ed. 1964).
80 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
•
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is not a suit at common law or in the nature of such a suit. It
is a statutory proceeding. Reinstatement of the employee and
payment for time lost are requirements imposed for violation
of the statute and are remedies appropriate to its enforce-
ment. The contention under the Seventh Amendment is with-
out merit."
It is submitted that the Court held there was no right to jury trial
because the proceedings were before an administrative tribunal rather
than a court. The underlying policy is the need to Uphold the process
of administrative adjudication and to allow administrative tribunals to
issue orders for payment of money. When the adjudicative decision is
to be rendered by a court, as it is under Title VII, Jones & Laughlin
would have no applicability.
In the writer's opinion the solution to the problem of jury trial in
court litigation of newly created statutory rights is to be found in an
examination of the nature of the proceedings rather than the nature of
the right, and it is submitted that this is precisely the approach taken
by the Supreme Court in Jones & Laughlin. In that case the proceed-
ings were not of the common-law type; they were not even judicial
proceedings, but quasi-judicial. When the proceedings are judicial the
question is whether they are equitable or legal in nature. If legal there
is a right to jury trial. If equitable there is not. The main clue to the
nature of the proceedings is the character of the remedy which is
sought. Thus, in a Title VII case, if the complainant seeks back pay
there would be a right of jury trial, since the remedy is in the nature
of a common-law money judgment. If he seeks an order that he be
employed or reinstated in his job, there is no right of jury trial because
the remedy is equitable, an injunction.
The difficulty with the foregoing analysis is that complainants
in many Title VII cases will seek both legal and equitable remedies,
e.g., reinstatement plus back pay. Decisions on equitable matters, such
as whether an injunction will issue, and if so the terms of the injunc-
tion, of course cannot be made by a jury. The question is whether the
judge in his resolution of the equitable issues may also resolve the
legal issues. Support for such a practice will undoubtedly be sought
in the tradition whereby courts of equity award damages as an incident
to the award of equitable relief, e.g., damages for delay in performance
of a contract as an incident to specific performance of the contract.
Whether the constitutional right to jury trial may be lost as to legal
issues where they are characterized as incidental to equitable issues is
open to conjecture." Some courts will be inclined to say that it can be,
51 Id. at 48-49.
52 Compare id. ,
 at 48, with Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470 (1962).
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and may characterize a claimant's action for hiring, reinstatement, or
other injunctive relief as "equitable," and bold that back wages may
be awarded by the judge as an incident to his award of equitable relief.
An argument in support of- this approach is suggested below.°
Claimants' advocates will of course recognize that a right to a jury
trial may be no boon to a claimant, since both parties may insist upon
jury trial when the issues are triable to a jury." To put it mildly, many
claimants will feel that southern jurors will be more inclined to favor
defendants than claimants who belong to minority groups. As a matter
of tactics, claimants' attorneys may therefore wish to frame their com-
plaints to make it appear that they seek primarily injunctive relief,
with damages as an incident thereto."
This writer believes that the law requires an approach which pre-
serves the right to jury trial on legal issues when the case has both legal
and equitable aspects. Characterizing a proceeding as "equitable" to
justify an "incidental" award of damages may have been valid when
proceedings at law and in equity were conducted in separate courts or
on separate sides of the court, since it eliminated the need to conduct
two lawsuits." But since the merger of law and equity by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, this situation no longer obtains in the federal
courts. To illustrate, in a Title VII action for hiring and unpaid wages,
the judge should decide whether an injunction should issue requiring
the hiring of the claimant, and the jury should decide whether damages
should be awarded and if so their amount. This does not completely
solve the problem because some issues will be common to the legal and
equitable aspects of the case. Thus, neither damages nor an injunction
can be awarded unless the factual issue of discrimination is resolved in
favor of the claimant. Such a common issue should be tried by the jury
to protect the right to jury trial.
This approach may be illustrated by a recent Fourth Circuit deci-
53 See p. 514 infra.
54 E.g., Dairy Queen, Inc, v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). Sec Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b).
55 Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, supra note 54, discussed in text and in note 56 infra,
would seem to indicate that such an effort will be likely to fail as a method of elimin-
ating the right to jury trial.
55 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), indicates that under the
merged law and equity procedure of the Federal Rules, jury trial on questions which
affect the legal issues is feasible (and required) to a greater extent than under the prac-
tice prior to merger. "Thus, the justification for equity's deciding legal issues once it
obtains jurisdiction, and refusing to dismiss a case, merely because subsequently a
legal remedy becomes available, must be re-evaluated in the light of the liberal joinder
provisions of the Federal Rules which allow legal and equitable causes to be brought
and resolved in one civil action." Id. at 509. Compare Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, supra
note 54, at 471, where it was said (in discussing Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106 (1891)) that
even the convenience of one trial did not justify joinder of legal and equitable claims
under federal practice prior to the merger of law and equity.
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sion." A union member sued the union under the Landrum-Griffin Act
for damages and restoration to membership. The court held that the
union member had a right to jury trial on the issues connected with the
claim for damages, including factual issues which were common to
both the legal and equitable aspects of the case. (The injunction for
restoration to membership was equitable, damages were legal.) The
court said that, "Where issues underlying equitable and legal causes of
action have been exactly the same, the Supreme Court has been careful
to preserve a litigant's right to jury trial on the factual issues, even
where a stronger basis was presented for equitable than for legal
relief."' In so holding the Fourth Circuit expressly declined to follow
a contrary decision of the Sixth Circuit." The Fourth Circuit's holding
seems clearly preferable in view of the Supreme Court's Dairy Queen,
Inc. v. Wood decision, in which it was made explicitly clear that the
right to jury trial on legal issues is not to be lost except "under the most
imperative circumstances" by the court's prior resolution of the equita-
ble issues involved in the case."
Most of the cases dealing with trial of federal statutory actions
recognize that equitable issues are to be tried by the court and legal
issues by the jury. Thus, under the Fair Labor Standards Act an action
by an employee for back wages carries a right to jury trial,' while a
suit by the Secretary of Labor to enjoin the employer from refusing to
pay back wages is equitable and triable by the judge." Similarly, when
a veteran seeks to enforce his re-employment rights there is a right to
jury trial when he seeks damages for lost wages," but not if he seeks a
court order requiring the defendant to re-employ him." Professor
Moore has collected many cases under various statutes illustrating the
point." Decisions allowing prior trial of equitable issues and conse-
quent elimination of the right to jury trial on common legal issues
should not be followed in view of Dairy Queen.
57 Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile Workers, 350 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1965).
58 Id. at 1018.
59 McCraw v. United Ass'n of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing
industry, supra note 23.
00 Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, supra note 54, at 472. See also Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, supra note 56.
Olearchick v. American Steel Foundries, 73 F. Supp. 273 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
62 Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1965). The distinction between an action
for back wages and a suit to enjoin continued refusal to pay back wages is of course a
thin one. Title VII claimants who wish to avoid giving the respondent a right to jury
trial may wish to frame their complaints to seek such an injunction. The practice has
express statutory authorization under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1069 (1938),
29 U.S.C. § 217 (1964), which it lacks under Title VII.
53 Steffen v. Farmers Elevator Serv. Co., 109 F. Supp. 16 (NM. Iowa 1952).
04 Strelitz v. Surrey Classics, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
65 5 Moore, Federal Practice 138.11[7] (2d ed. 1964).
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•
F. Class Actions
Can a class action be brought on behalf of a group of plaintiffs?
If so it would seem to fall within the so-called "spurious" class suit
provisions of Rule 23 (a) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If proposals of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial
Conference of the United States for revision of the federal class action
rule are adopted, they may significantly affect the answer to this
question." One difficulty with permitting class actions is the likelihood
that many questions will arise in the course of suit which affect only
one member of the class. This was part of the rationale of a New York
job discrimination case which held that an action on behalf of a class
of Negroes could not be maintained.67 In this connection the court
noted that the various alleged Wrongs were subject to separate defenses
against various members of the suing class. Another reason for the
decision was the fact that the various members of the suing class
should each have been allowed to exercise his right to select the forum
in which to pursue his remedy. New York law allowed claimants to
seek relief not only in a civil damage action but also before the New
York Commission for Human Rights. This second reason could apply
in a federal action if the discrimination in question were covered by a
state or local FEP law. A similar application could be made if the
matter were subject to other types of federal administrative action,
such as proceedings before the NLRB or before various agencies which
administer the programs prohibiting discrimination under federal
contracts."
If claimants desire to bring an action on behalf of a class of
plaintiffs they would do well to make it clear in the pleadings and at
every possible stage of the litigation that the only remedy sought on
behalf of members of the class who were not joined as individual plain-
tiffs is an order prohibiting future employment discrimination against
them. No order of hiring, reinstatement, back pay, or the like should
be sought on their behalf, since most of the questions peculiar to indi-
vidual , situations would become pertinent only if such affirmative reme-
dies were sought on their behalf. Such a technique would of course not
66
 The Supreme Court adopted revisions of the class suit rules on February 28,
1966, to take effect on July I, 1966. 249 F. Supp. 145, 150-51.
67
 Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 256 N.Y.S.2d 584, 204 N.E.2d 627 (1965).
68 In Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 61 L.R.R.M. 2458 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), the court
permitted a class action to be brought under Title VII on behalf of Negro employees for
the purpose of enjoining future discrimination, but refused to allow the class action to
resolve specific complaints of discrimination against particular claimants. However, this
decision is to a certain extent inconsistent with the suggestion that the availability of an
administrative remedy which might have been pursued by members of the class of
plaintiffs will render a class action inappropriate. For a discussion of the limited extent
to which the case permitted the class action to be maintained, see note 10 supra.
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affect the "other administrative relief" argument suggested by the New
York case discussed in the preceding paragraph.
G. Joinder of Defendants
As the discussion of remedies elsewhere in this article makes
clear," it is likely that an individual claimant may obtain a remedy
which adversely affects the rights of persons other than the party
against whom a claim is primarily directed. Must such third persons be
joined as parties to the action? For example, if a Negro seeks a job
given to a white person as a result of a discriminatory refusal to hire
the Negro, must the white person be joined as a party to the enforce-
ment action in addition to the employer? The gloss on Rule 19, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, is of course pertinent if the action is in a
federal court." One can make strong arguments that employees whose
rights would be affected by a Title VII action not only must be joined,
but also that they are "indispensable" rather than "necessary" parties.
This might follow, for example, from the holding that in an action by
the State of Texas against the Interstate Commerce Commission to
have the ICC's rulings on wages declared unconstitutional, employees
who were operating under the rulings were indispensable parties. 11 It is
difficult to overcome the argument that the interests of an employee
whose job may be given to another as a result of a lawsuit are so signifi-
cantly affected by the litigation that his joinder in the action ought to
be required as a necessary, if not indispensable, step. (A related ques-
tion is whether such employees should be permitted to intervene.) Re-
spondents in many parts of the country can certainly be expected to
argue that such employees should be made parties, since it transforms
the posture of the action from individual v. employer to individual v.
individual, often Negro individual v. white individual, both competing
for the same job.
Some federal statutes involving court actions to secure employ-
ment rights have attempted to solve the joinder problem. For example,
Section 9(d) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act pro-
vides that in a veteran's action to obtain his re-employment rights in a
federal district court "only the employer shall be deemed a necessary
party respondent to any such action." 72 Title VII says nothing about
the problem, so it will have to be resolved by the courts.
If joinder of other employees does occur, claimants may wish to
support the contention that remedies may be awarded to alleviate the
69 Text infra p. 516.
70 Subsequent to the writing of this article, Rule 19 was amended, supra note 66,
which may render some of the textual discussion irrelevant.
71 Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S. 158 (1921).
72 62 Stat. 614 (1948), 50 U.S.C. § 459(d) (1964).
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economic burdens placed on white employees by a Title VII remedy."
The availability of remedies for white employees may favorably affect
the posture of the case from the claimant's standpoint, since it would
no longer be a pure case of individual v. individual. Claimants should
consider this possibility before they urge that such remedies may not
be afforded, a position they might instinctively tend to take because
affording such special remedies to whites seems itself to be discrim-
inatory.
M. REMEDIES
Title VII sets forth broad provisions for remedies. In an in-
dividual's enforcement action the court may "enjoin the respon-
dent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include re-
instatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay. . .
In a pattern or practice suit the Attorney General may file a complaint
"requesting such relief, including an application for a permanent or
temporary injunction, restraining order or other order against the
person or persons responsible for such pattern or practice, as he deems
necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights herein described." 15
No reference to reinstatement or hiring of employees or to back pay is
made with respect to pattern or practice suits, and whether such relief
could be granted in such an action is an open question which is com-
plicated still further by doubt as to whether an aggrieved individual
could intervene in the Attorney General's action.
The discussion of remedies is organized by classifying them as
"law remedies" and "equitable remedies." Money damages was of
course the basic remedy in an action at law, and under Title VII back
pay falls into this category. Imaginative cliamants' lawyers will of
course explore the possibility of obtaining other types of money
damages, such as compensation for mental suffering and distress as a
result of employment discrimination. Damages other than back pay are
not discussed in this article, however. In seeking damages in addition
to back pay claimants should not limit themselves to Title VII. It has,
for example, been suggested that various tort theories may permit
recovery for employment discrimination."
Equitable remedies may of course be as varied as the cases which
come before the courts, and it would be impossible at this time even to
make a comprehensive list of the problems, let alone suggest their
73 See p. 517 infra,
74 § 706(g)•
75 § 707(a).
78 Comment, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 430, 467 (1965).
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solutions. A few problems are discussed in the hope that they will illus-
trate the nature of the task and of the questions which may come up. 77
The coverage in this topic has been divided between equitable and
legal remedies as a convenient and familiar method of organization. By
so doing, however, there is no intention to imply that the courts are
necessarily foreclosed from treating Title VII proceedings as strictly
equitable in nature. As pointed out immediately below, arguments
can be made on both sides of this question." Compensatory jus-
tice, which is in part at least an aspect of the problem of remedies, is
discussed elsewhere in this symposium. 7° Cynics may of course char-
acterize this article's suggestions for economic compensation to white
workers who are affected by Title VII remedies" as compensatory
justice in reverse, and to the extent that such a characterization is
accurate, the problem is discussed here.
A. Law Remedies: Back Pay
It would seem that back pay ought to be awarded routinely,
almost as a matter of absolute right, when the claimant proves he has
suffered money damages (loss of income from employment) as a
result of the respondent's unlawful employment practice. Should the
court be allowed greater discretion with respect to the award of such
damages than would be allowed in a traditional action at law? The
problem is presented by the statutory provision that the court may
order "reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back
pay. . . 2' 8' Does "with or without" imply discretion? If so, on what
basis is it to be exercised? The statutory implication of discretion must
be offset against the.traditional notion that (assuming back pay actions
under Title VII are in the nature of actions at law) in actions at law
damages are a matter , of "right."
It may also be argued from the statutory language just quoted
that back pay awards may be made only as an incident to equitable
orders for reinstatement or hiring of employees. This would support
the position that back pay should be awarded as a matter of discretion,
in the manner of equity. This interpretation of the statute would mean,
of course, that there is no such thing as an action for back pay under
Title VII. It would mean an abandonment of the tradition that
damages are the "usual" remedy afforded by the courts. An abandon-
ment of this tradition should not be undertaken lightly. The "no action
77 Attorney's fees, which in a broad sense are a kind of remedy, have been discussed
supra pp. 501-06.
78 Cf. text pp. 507-10 supra. The answer to this question affects such important
matters as the right to jury trial.
79 See Schmidt, Title VII: Coverage and Comments, p. 459 supra, X-REF.
80 Text infra 516.
81	 706(g).
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for back pay alone" interpretation would also eliminate the possibility
of awarding an economically significant remedy to complainants in a
situation which may be expected to arise. Thus; an unemployed Negro
who was discriminatorily refused a job but who, after some delay,
found a second job which he preferred to keep, would have no remedy
available which imposed a distinct economic benefit upon him per-
sonally. Damages for income lost while he was seeking the second job
would give him such a remedy. It seems unlikely that the statute gives
him no remedy in a situation of that sort.
The jury trial problem, treated elsewhere in this article, 82 is signi-
ficantly affected by the argument that the statute treats back pay
awards as an incident to equitable relief. If the statute does so, the
jury trial problem becomes a predominantly, if not entirely, constitu-
tional question.
B. Equitable Remedies
1. Scope of Injunction.--What should be the scope of the basic
equitable remedy, injunction, in Title VII cases? In its most limited
form it would simply order the defendant not to discriminate against
the claimant, and would make this prohibition more specific by re-
ferring to the particular problem involved in the case, e.g., it would
order the defendant to consider the claimant's application for employ-
ment without regard to the claimant's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. In most situations the order should go beyond this and
require affirmative remedial action as expressly authorized by the
statute.83
Insofar as the injunction orders the respondent not to engage in
employment discrimination in the future, one problem of its scope con-
cerns the persons who are to be protected by the order. Whom should
the respondent be ordered to stop discriminating against? Just the indi-
vidual plaintiff? All Negroes? Members of all minority groups pro-
tected by the statute? To reframe the problem, can the defendant be
ordered not to discriminate against persons other than the individual
plaintiff? 84
 If so, an injunction which, for example, orders an end to
employment discrimination against all Negroes would provide an alter-
native, to a class action brought on behalf of a group of Negroes 8b
Indeed, such an injunction might be preferable to a class action from
the standpoint of claimants because of the possibility that members of
the cl'iss of plaintiffs may be bound by an adverse judicial decision, a
result which would not obtain if the action were simply brought by an
82 supra pp. 507-10.
83
 § 706(g) quoted in part supra text accompanying note 74.
84 This problem is discussed in greater detail in Berg, Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 Brooklyn L. Rev. 62, 86-88 (1964).
85 Class actions are discussed supra, pp. 511-12.
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individual who seeks an injunction forbidding discrimination against a
class.
2. Ellects on Other Employees.—Claimants may seek certain rem-
edies which affect the rights of other employees. This does not refer to
the "right" of white employees not to have Negro coworkers or to have
segregated cafeterias and restrooms. Such alleged "rights" are specific-
ally negated by Title VII. The reference is rather to economic rights
of particular white workers which are directly and immediately affected
by a remedy sought by the claimant. For example, if the claimant
seeks a court order which would require an employer to give the
claimant a job which the employer had given to a white person after a
discriminatory refusal to hire the claimant, the economic rights of the
white job holder are directly and immediately affected. By describing
such economic interests of the white workers as "rights" there is no
intention to offend those who would prefer another term to describe
the claims of the white workers. Persons who would prefer to describe
them as "interests" or as something else are welcome to do so. The
point is that the remedy will have a direct economic effect on the white
worker—not on white workers in general, but on a particular person.
Nor is use of the term "right" intended to imply a question-
begging inference that the white worker in the example has a right
to the job and that the Negro claimant does not, and that the proposed
remedy can therefore not be granted. The writer's opinion is quite the
opposite. By expressly authorizing the remedies of hiring and reinstate-
ment Title VII must contemplate that such rights of white workers
may indeed be affected. Intentional discrimination is hard to prove, and
that is exactly what must be proved if the court is to afford any
remedy in an individual's enforcement action." If the charge is dis-
criminatory refusal to hire, it would seem that as a practical matter
(if not as a matter of law) it will be necessary to prove that someone
else was hired in place of the Negro. How else can one prove intentional
discrimination if (as can be expected) the employer will not admit it?
The remedy of hiring would thus be most appropriate where another
person has already been given the job sought by the Negro. Therefore,
the statute's reference to hiring must mean that the job rights of the
other person may be affected by the court's remedy. "Hiring" must be
taken to mean (at least in some cases) hiring into the specific job
which the claimant was discriminatorily refused.
The fact that certain remedies may affect the rights of white job
holders can significantly influence the posture of the case. This would
be especially true if, as suggested elsewhere in this article, 87 such job
88 Section 706(g) authorizes the court to grant an appropriate remedy if it "finds
that the respondent has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice. . . ."
87 Text supra p. 512.
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holders must be joined as parties to the action. Even if they need not
be joined, the potential effect on their rights may be expected to in-
fluence psychologically a judge's willingness to afford the remedy and
even to find the facts which would make any remedy appropriate. It
may therefore be in the best interests of claimants to support sug-
gestions which tend to alleviate the economic effects on other workers.
How may such alleviation be accomplished? The answer must
depend upon the circumstances of particular cases, and the traditional
flexibility of equity in fashioning remedies would be called into play.
As an illustration, if it appears that there is a reasonable likelihood
that an equivalent job will open up in the near future, both the white
job holder and the Negro claimant could be given work. One of them
could occupy the current opening and the other could be compensated
for the time he was out of work awaiting the next opening. (The em-
ployer might prefer to put both to work immediately in such a situa-
tion.) If one is to wait, there is of course no reason to assume (as is
sometimes done) that it must be the Negro who waits. A remedy of
this kind may be justified on the ground that it is the employer who has
committed the unlawful employment practice and that it is not un-
reasonable that he be required 'to protect the job interests of all who
suffer from his unlawful conduct, including both job claimants.
The availability of such a judicial remedy is complicated by the
fact that the job rights of the white worker may be subject to adjudi-
cation under an industrial grievance system, culminating perhaps in
arbitration. The court would have to take account of such systems,
possibly by indicating that the rights of the white job holder are to be
determined under the grievance procedure, although jurisdiction could
be retained to see that the result of the grievance process does not inter-
fere with the court's decree. The problems are difficult and compli-
cated, but if the courts are to participate in the resolution of industrial
disputes, as required by Title VII, their participation must take
cognizance of the other institutions involved in the process of industrial
adjudication—whether grievance procedures, arbitration, NLRB pro-
ceedings, or what have you.
A major argument against fashioning a remedy which gives
special economic protection to the displaced white workers is that it
would be a violation of the prohibitions against racial discrimination
imposed by Title VII. Would conferring such direct economic benefits
constitute discrimination with respect to "compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment" or would it "classify" employees
on racial grounds, as forbidden by section 703 (a)? Arguably so, but
before such acts are forbidden by the section they must discriminate
against an individual or deprive an individual of employment oppor-
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tunities." No individual would be discriminated against or deprived of
employment opportunities by such a remedy, and therefore the anti-
discrimination provisions of the statute do not necessarily forbid it.
3. Discriminatory Seniority Practices.—The most difficult problem
of formulating a remedy for a discriminatory seniority system is to re-
structure the existing seniority rolls to eliminate the effects of past
discriminatory practices. This is not to say that the other half of the
problem, formulating rules for the nondiscriminatory operation of the
system in the future, is easy. There may be situations where a remedy
for past discrimination may be formulated without major difficulty, as
for example when there are two seniority lists, one white and the
other Negro, both based on date of original hiring by the employer.
The restructured list would simply be a combination of the two pre-
existing lists, with seniority based on date of original hire.
When the seniority system is more complicated, abolition of the
effects of past discrimination is more •difficult. Suppose, for example,
that seniority is in part based upon job classification, and that workers
in certain jobs have greater seniority than workers in other jobs, with-
out regard to date of hire, and that workers in senior jobs can "bump"
workers in junior jobs in case of layoff. Suppose further that the dis-
criminatory practice was the assignment of Negroes to jobs with
lesser seniority, but there are some whites in the predominantly Negro
classifications and some Negroei in the predominantly white classifi-
cations. Suppose further that the hierarchy, of job classifications for
seniority purposes is arranged in order of the degree of skill required
by the job, so that the end result is that workers in jobs requiring a
higher level of skill have greater seniority. Ina situation of that sort,
not only would it be difficult to make a new seniority list which
eliminates the effects of past discrimination, it would also be difficult
to formulate principles for nondiscriminatory operation of the system
in, the future. Many questions would have to be answered in such
an effort; for example, to what extent should protection be given to the
employer's presumably legitimate interest in seeing that the most highly
skilled workers are laid off last?
One problem with the entire concept that a reconstituted seniority
list is an appropriate remedy for past discrimination under Title VII
is that the "right" to be free from employment discrimination was not
granted by Title VII until July 2, 1964. Is it proper to deprive white
persons of seniority rights which vested prior 'to that date? One ap-
proach to this problem is to determine whether Title VII is retroactive.
as Section 703(a) makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
"discriminate against any individual . ." or to "limit, segregate, or classify his employees'
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
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Interesting possibilities along this line are suggested by the Supreme
Court's decision in .Hamm v. City of Rock Hill" that state criminal
convictions of civil rights workers for engaging in lunch counter sit-ins
were abated by passage of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
convictions had occurred before Title II was enacted, but they none-
theless were held to have abated as a consequence of the subsequent
passage of the act. While seniority problems are obviously distinguish-
able, Hamm did in a sense. give a certain retroactive effect to the Civil
Rights Act. Its applicability to civil actions under Title VII, either by
direct analogy or as an indication of the Supreme Court's probable
attitude, is an open question, but one well worth exploring in an ap-
propriate case.
Besides saying that Title VII is retroactive, claimants may argue
that discrimination is illegal on the basis of substantive principles which
were in effect before Title VII. These principles might derive, for
example, from state or local FEP laws, from the duty of fair representa-
tion under the National Labor Relations Act, 9° or from various tort
theories."
The problem of providing economic relief to white workers whose
economic interests are affected by a Title VII remedy was discussed
.elsewhere in this article." This affects seniority remedies because a
white worker who ends up with less seniority as a result of a Title VII
remedy has been affected economically. He may, for example, be laid
off when he would have been kept on the job under the old seniority
system. Aside from the problem of whether economic relief in any form
would be appropriate in such a situation, the writer was at first in-
clined to say that no way existed to provide such protection. On re-
flection, however, it appeared that a measure of protection could be
provided by a fund to compensate such workers for actual losses sus-
tained by them as a result of the change in seniority. Thus, a worker
who was laid off ten days earlier than he would have been under the
old system could receive full or partial payment for loss of ten days'
wages. The expense of maintaining such a fund could be imposed
upon the employer because he was responsible for the discriminatory
seniority system in the first place. Part of the cost could even be im-
posed on a union, which shared responsibility for the discriminatory
8D 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
90
 For a discussion of the duty of fair representation, see, e.g., Rosen, The Law
and Racial Discrimination in Employment, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 729 (1965).
91 For a discussion of tort theories, see Douda, Damages for Mental Suffering in
Discrimination Cases, 15 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 1 (1965); Comment, 32 U. CM. L. Rev.
430 (1965). Cf. Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Council of Steel Workers, 223 F. Supp. 12
' (N.D. Ill. 1963), vacated as moot, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
914 (1965).
92 Text supra p. 517.
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system. Even if creation of such a fund is not an appropriate judicial
remedy, it might be possible to create one by union-employer collective
bargaining, or even for a union to finance one on its own initiative.
Any such fund would be open to questions of legality similar to
those raised in the discussion of other forms of economic protection to
white workers," this time under section 703(c). The question is
whether establishment of the fund would itself be discriminatory.
4. Refusal to Furnish Job Application.--Special problems of rem-
edy arise when the act of discrimination is refusal to give an application
form to a job candidate. Will the court simply order that the Negro ap-
plicant be permitted to fill out an application form, that it be con-
sidered along with other applications, or that the Negro be given a
job now? A Washington case answered the question by upholding an
order that the Negro be offered the next vacant job in the pertinent
classification "provided she meets the standard qualifications of other
applicants for employment, but without regard to race, color, creed or
national origin. . . ."" The job for which the Negro had been refused
an application had not been filled at the time the order was made, so
the case does not solve the problem where a white worker has been
given the job for which the Negro was refused an application. The
vigorous dissent argued that the order approved by the majority was
in itself discriminatory (against whites),.and should have been formu-
lated to permit the employer to hire "the best qualified person without
any consideration to race, creed, color or national origin. . . ."" The
majority gives a negative answer to another of the fundamental ques-
tions of remedy, whether an order to hire a Negro claimant into the
next job opening unlawfully discriminates against qualified whites who
might otherwise apply for and perhaps be given the job."
C. Remedies under Analogous Statutes
Guidance to the solution of problems of remedy under Title VII
can be sought not only under state FEP laws, but also under other
federal statutes." There is a particularly large fund of experience under
the National Labor Relations Act. That experience may be used for
example to help decide whether it is permissible under Title VII to
affect employed whites adversely in order to afford a remedy to a
93 Sec pp. 517-18 supra.
94 Arnett v. Seattle Gen. Hosp., 65 Wash. 2d 22, 24, 395 P.2d 503, 504 (1964).
95
 Id. at 508, 510.
06 The majority did not pass on the constitutionality of the order because that
issue had not been raised below.
97
 Federal statutes in the labor relations area which present problems such as
hiring, reinstatement, or back pay (all of which are available under Title VII) include, '
e.g., the National Labor Relations Act, the Railway Labor Act, the Landrum-Griffin
Act, wage-hour laws, and various veterans' re-employment statutes.
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Negro claimant. It has been held under the NLRA that unfair labor
practice strikers are entitled to reinstatement in their jobs "irrespective
of the effect that such reinstatement may have upon the tenure of new
employees hired as replacements.'"° Such strikers must be given back
their jobs and the replacements discharged so this may be done.° 9 The
position of strike replacements can be compared to that of whites who
have been hired instead of Negroes. If the resulting analogy is followed
it would indicate that under Title VII it is permissible to give a Negro
a remedy which requires the displacement of a white worker from his
job. The analogy is pressing because of two similarities between the
NLRA and Title VII: (1) Both statutes give protection against dis-
crimination; 1" and (2) the remedy provisions of Title VII were pat-
terned on those of the NLRA. 1° 1 While the precedents under analogous
statutes should not be blindly applied, they do provide bearings for
passing through the uncharted territories of Title VII.
IV. CONCLUSION
The statute's failure to give the Commission power to issue quasi-
judicial enforcement orders is a continuing subject of controversy. For
example, the House Committee on Education and Labor, which was
originally responsible for the bill which, after much amendment, be-
came Title VII, has favorably reported a bill which would amend
Title VII to give the Commission powers of administrative adjudica-
tion.'°2 Will Title VII work in its present form, without such pro-
visions? This, of course, is a question of fundamental importance,
since its answer is relevant to problems of broader import than en-
forcement of the federal policy against employment discrimination.
This does not mean that employment discrimination is an insignificant
aspect of race relations in our society, nor that the race relations
problem itself is unimportant. Quite the contrary. The point is that
the nature of the institutional structures which are vested with the
°S NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954).
00 Forkosch, Labor Law § 522, at 816-17 (1965); Smith & Merrifield, Cases and
Materials on Labor Relations Law 194 (1960).
100 Section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964), makes it an unfair labor practice to encourage or
discourage membership in a labor organization "by discrimination in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. • . ." The anti-dis-
crimination provisions of Title VII are in § 703.
101 Section 706(g) of Title VII provides that the court may "order such affirmative
action as may be appropriate, which may include reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay. .. ." Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49
Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964), provides that the NLRB can order the
respondent "to take . . . affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or
without back pay. . . ."
102 H.R. 10065, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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power to enforce laws raises questions which go to the very foundations
upon which society's system of law enforcement rests.
Are the courts suitable institutions for the enforcement of laws,
especially laws which are designed to effect basic rearrangements in
de facto and de jure relationships in society? The modern tendency,
which is especially though not exclusively found on the federal level,
has been to give to administrative agencies rather than to courts the
power to issue initial enforcement orders which have the character of
adjudicative decision. This can only be taken as evidence of disaf-
fection with the courts as effective institutions for the administration
of laws of social reform. This, of course, means courts at the level of
initial decision, since most administrative adjudications are subject to
judicial review and since the appellate courts are proven instruments
of self-generated social reform. If the efforts to give the Commission
powers of administrative adjudication are 'not immediately successful,
the record of the trial courts in enforcing Title VII may well prove
to be a kind of institutional testing ground for the future role of courts
at the trial level in the social reform process. If the courts fail in their
task, the proponents of future reform laws can be expected to fight
even harder for administrative adjudication. If the courts succeed,
supporters of courts as prime institutions of formal adjudication will
have something to point to when the question comes up again, as it
inevitably will. Make no mistake about it. The enforcement system
created by Title VII was a deliberate choice of court over administra-
tive agency as the type of institution in which the adjudicative power
should be vested. The legislative history, with its progressive with-
drawal of the Commission from an adjudicative role, makes this
abundantly clear.
At least one court103 and some commentators 1" have approached
the Title VII enforcement procedures by asking whether they reflect a
statutory choice of a "private right" as distinguished from a "public
right" as Title VII's basic premise. There is much merit in the sugges-
tion that they do, and in analyzing Title VII on the basis of the
resolution of this problem. The present writer has chosen not to ap-
proach the problem in this way, not only because others have already
covered the subject, but because the public right v. private right
formulation does not strike at the heart of the philosophical basis, if
you will, of the Title VII enforcement process. The philosophical basis
103
 Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., supra note 68; see discussion note 10 supra.
104 See e.g., Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 31 Brooklyn L. Rev. 62 (1964); Comment, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 430 (1965). Each
of these was published prior to the Supreme Court's decision in International Union,
UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965), discussed infra note 108.
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is preference for court over administrative agency as an instrument in
which to lodge adjudicative power.
Stress on the "private right" aspects of Title VII may lead to
understatement of the significance of the Commission's role. The power
to issue an adjudicative order is only one aspect of the enforcement
process. The Commission wields enormous influence from its role as
conciliator and implementer."' While it is still too early to say from
the Commission's record how effective it will be, there is no reason to
throw up hands in despair."' The adjudicative decision is only one
kind of implementation. Voluntary observance of the requirements of
the statute and settlement of disputes without adjudication are equally
important. The Commission plays an important role in both. Not only
does its conciliation activity promote settlement, but its other im-
plementation activity will hopefully promote voluntary observance.
Beyond its promotion of voluntary observance of the specific prohibi-
tions of Title VII, the Commission can and should encourage positive
efforts to make jobs equally available to all minority groups. It is at-
tempting to do so now by promoting what it calls "affirmative action"
by employers and others covered by the statute.107 So even if the
Title VII "right" is "private," much of the implementation activity is
by a public body.'"
As with any new statute, Title VII leaves many questions un-
answered. They are especially abundant in the procedural area because
of the last minute creation of a new enforcement system for Title VII
105 The Commission has attempted to enhance this influence by providing in its
procedural regulations that "a charge filed by an aggrieved person may be withdrawn
only with the consent of the Commission." Procedural Regulations of The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission § 1601.9, 30 Fed. Reg. 8408 (1965).
The foregoing regulation bears on the "public right" v. "private right" question, as
does § 706(a) of Title VII, which says a member of the Commission may file a charge.
This permits the Commission to conduct an investigation, and (after finding reasonable
cause) attempt to conciliate the dispute.
100 The statement in the text does not indicate the writer's rejection of the assertion
that the Commission should be given quasi-judicial powers. No position on that question
is taken in this article. But so long as the present procedures are in force it will be
necessary to try to make them work.
107 See, e.g., 60 Lab. Rel. Rep. 193 (1965) (remarks of Commission Chairman
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.).
108 In International Union, UAW v. Scofield, supra note 104, at 217-21, the Supreme
Court indicated that the National Labor Relations Act does not create a dichotomy
between public and private rights, but rather blends the two. In doing so the Court
refused to use the public right v. private right distinction as a guide to the resolution
of the problem which it faced (whether to permit a charging party who was successful
in proceedings before the NLRB to intervene in proceedings for judicial review of the
Board decision in a circuit court) and (at least in the present writer's opinion) thereby
cast doubt on the utility of this approach as a method of resolving difficult problems of
procedure involved in administrative agency-court relationships. See Hail v. Werthan
Bag Corp., supra note 68, where the court adopted the Scofield approach without re-
ferring to that case.
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as the basis for the so-called "leadership compromise" necessary to
obtain Republican votes for Senate cloture over debate on the entire
Civil Rights Act. Whether Title VII thereby became a sacrificial lamb
for the benefit of the other titles remains to be seen. Once the wrinkles
have been ironed out, Title VII may well (to mix the metaphor once
again) turn out to be far from a dead letter.
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